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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the Bubble Economy of 1992, Japan has been suffering from the
severest and the longest lasting recession it has experienced in the 50 years following the World
War II. In this thesis, the true implications of real estate securitization and its potential
contribution to the recovery of the Japanese economy are examined. Repairing real estate
market is one of the keys to reversing the economic downtrend. The results show that real
estate securitization will contribute significantly to the effort to save the Japanese economy.
However, it is important to reform the practices, systems, and infrastructure of the real estate
market to carry out successful securitization. The major positive implications of real estate
securitization include diversification of financing and investment opportunities, the reduction of
liquidity risk of real estate, the expansion of the real estate market by increasing the numbers of
transactions, promotion of direct financing rather than indirect, use of widened techniques for
managing Japanese individual assets, the identification of new business opportunities, and
finally, by promotion of reform of a land evaluation method to meet a global standard.
Thesis Supervisor: Frank Levy
Title: Professor, the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT
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INTRODUCTION
Securitizing non-performing loans and mortgaged real estate has attracted the attention of the
Japanese Government and the people as a solution to the problem of the non-performing loans
that are equivalent to $500 billion dollars (in book value), now held by the Japanese financial
institutions during the Bubble Economy. "Actually, the arrival of securitization offers many
economic advantages, including tax reform, stronger security perfection, and improved market
liquidity for asset-backed notes"'. However, the debate has been often held without: 1) why the
purpose of securitization is reduced to solving the bad debt problem; 2) if securitization of non-
performing loans is really feasible in Japan where there are so many peculiarities in real estate
laws, regulations and customs; 3) and why real estate securitization has not really occurred
much before in Japan. Contrary to the Japanese regulators' expectation, what securitization
can do should be perceived in a longer perspective, rather than in a short one, such as solving
the bad debt problems.
Securitizing a large number of non-performing loans requires well developed infrastructure for
regulations, the real estate market and the capital market, all of which are still at the
developmental stage in Japan. Securitizing non-performing loans is feasible as long as the loan
collateral is generating a stream of cash. However, it is difficult for Japan without changes in
regulations, taxation systems, valuation methods, and market transactions, regarding real estate.
Therefore, developing a proper infrastructure for real estate securitization is the first and
foremost priority. In my thesis, I analyze the trend of the Japanese current real estate and
financial market. While taking into account market trends, I propose what needs to be done to
carry out successful real estate securitization politically and institutionally. Finally I offer
realistic goals of what securitization can do for the currently ailing Japanese real estate market
Masato Tanaka, A New Approach To Solving Japan's Real Estate Crisis, (Massachusetts, July 1998), p7
and the financial system.
A. Methodology
For the purpose of this thesis, I have collected and scrutinized data related to real estate
securitization from literature and articles. I also obtained important information from interviews
with people in charge of real estate securitization in four companies: two American investment
banks; an American consulting firm; and a Japanese commercial bank. Information procured by
interviews helped me refine the assertion made in my thesis.
B. Organization
My thesis has five components. CHAPTER 1 reviews the Japanese financial crisis that resulted
from the collapse of the Bubble Economy; and it describes the evolution of asset securitization
in Japan. CHAPTER 2 analyzes the securitization tactics used by the Resolution Trust
Corporation to solve the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis in the early 90's, that paved the way for
securitizing mortgage backed securities. This chapter also presents an overview of real estate
securitization. CHAPTER 3 describes the Japanese real estate market after the end of the
Bubble Economy and identifies obstacles to real estate securitization. CHAPTER 4 proposes
reforms regarding practices and systems of the real estate market in Japan that would be
necessary to carry out securitization, and argues for the merits of securitization. CHAPTER 5,
the concluding chapter, focuses upon realistic goals that securitization can achieve to end the
current Japanese financial crisis.
CHAPTER 1: THE HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE BUBBLE ECONOMY AND
EVOLUTION OF THE ASSET SECURITIZATION IN JAPAN
Chapter 1 discusses: 1) how the Japanese Bubble Economy evolved and finally collapsed; 2)
how serious the bad debt problem caused by the collapse of the Bubble is; 3) various difficulties
in solving the bad debt problem; 4) the Japanese government's countermeasure to overcome the
bad debt problem; 5) the government's intention to securitize non-performing loans, which it
learned from the techniques used by the Resolution Trust Corporation; and 6) features of
conventional securitized products in Japan.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH JAPAN'S CURRENT FINANCIAL SYSTEM?2
Since the beginning of 1997 there has been a series of failures by Japanese insurance
companies, stockbrokerages, and banks. To avoid public panic, the government repeatedly
announced that the deposits would be guaranteed. Still, the financial market was sensitive
enough to reflect the failures of financial institutions. Concerned about their own liquidity,
people changed their banks, thereby slowing the cash flow in the economy.
The state of low liquidity is further worsened by what is called a credit crunch. The enactment
of Prompt Corrective Action in April 1998' compelled banks to apply an internal credit rating
system. As a result, some long-standing customers experienced cash flow difficulties.
Credit creation is contracting. The only thing that is expanding is the volume of bank notes
printed by the Bank of Japan. The cash ratio4 stands at 8.8%, an approximately 1.8% increase
2 Yukihiko Endo, NRI Quarterly, (Tokyo, July 1998)
3 'Prompt Corrective Action' is the name for a number of measures designed to make bank operations more
transparent and to require banks to adopt proper risk-assessment procedures. The authorities, for their part, will
monitor whether the banks comply with the capital adequacy requirements of the Bank for International Settlements
and compel those that do not comply to take 'prompt corrective action' by either increasing their capital or reducing
their assets. Yukihiko Endo, NRI Ouarterly, (Tokyo, July 1998)
4 Cash ratio = Cash / (Cash + Deposit money + Time deposit + Certificate of deposit)
since 1992. As a result, many customers, including long-standing ones, have experienced
difficulties in borrowing money from banks.
The current status of Japanese financial institutions clearly implies the existence of systemic
risk. And the difference in interest rates between Japanese banks and foreign banks known as
"Japan Premium5", has increased remarkably. In December 1997, it once reached a 1.2%
difference from that of U.S. banks, and then settled around a 0.4% difference in June 1998. The
"Japan Premium" on interest rates sets a higher hurdle not only for problematic financial
institutions but also for financially sound ones to raise capital. Since April 1998, the premium
has not been as high as at the end of 1997. This is because of government actions taken by the
government to stabilize the financial system by using public funds. Still, the underlying crisis
has not gone away.
THE HISTORY OF THE BUBBLE ECONOMY
To understand why the current Japanese financial system is in crisis, one needs to understand the
behavior of Japanese banks during the Bubble Economy. There were two key markets; the stock
market and the real estate market. Japanese banks made large numbers of loans in these two markets
during the Bubble Economy, which were supported by a positive spiral that worked in the following
ways. Values in the stock market and the real estate market appreciated dramatically. Borrowers
could then use the equity in the assets created by the market appreciation to borrow more money
from banks. Borrowers borrowed money and then invested in stocks and real estate. In fact,
because of these purchases, both the stock and the real estate markets continued to go up and
borrowers again took advantage of further appreciation to raise additional and then increase their
investment in stocks and real estate. Everyone believed that this positive spiral would continue
5 The higher rates Japanese banks are charged to borrow funds overseas
forever during the Bubble Economy. No one, not even the banks thought these markets would
collapse. Banks ignored their credit policy and invested in stocks and real estate to maximize their
short term profits. Literally, everyone followed the "greater fool theory." At that time, Japanese
real estate, especially the commercial real estate market, had very high liquidity and it was just like a
financial instrument.
Real Estate prices reached their highest level in December 1989 in the six largest cities; Tokyo 23
wards, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe<Exhibit 1>. Urban land prices also increased
nearly fourfold between 1985 and 1991. The increase in land prices escalated during the decade
after 1986. In Japan as a whole, land prices increased by about 60% between 1985 and 1991.6
THE BURST OF THE BUBBLE ECONOMY
In 1992, however, the positive spiral suddenly reversed. Most of the investments in real estate made
during the Bubble Economy were for speculation, and the increase in value was supported only by
the high liquidity of the real estate market. Faced with the criticism of overpriced lands, the
Japanese Government limited bank loans to real estate and other non-banking industries. These
regulations signified that no more money could be lent to expand the markets. Soon, there were no
new buyers of properties anymore. The liquidity of the real estate market was dramatically
decreased, leading to the collapse of the real estate market and the price fall of land values. Real
estate lending by the most Japanese banks became under secured, leading to the collapse of the
Bubble Economy.
6 Howard C.Glbtuch, and Tadashi Kataoka, Real Estate Securitization Gaining Favor in France & Japan,
(London 1997), p3
Exhibit 1:Urban Land Price Index of Commercial Land
In Six Largest Cities in Japan
(Tokyo 23 wards, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe)
1990=100
Year Index
1985 25.6
1986 33.0
1987 44.2
1988 62.6
1989 78.3
1990 100.0
1991 103.3
1992 87.5
1993 67.9
1994 55.3
1995 41.9
1996 30.3
Source: Japan Real Estate Institute
THE BAD DEBT PROBLEM7
When the Bubble burst, both shares and property prices fell<Exhibit 2>. As a result, many
individual and institutional borrowers had difficulty paying back their loans because they faced their
projects such as equity investments and property developments came to a standstill. Because the
value of the loan collateral also plummeted, the volume of non-performing assets increased
dramatically. In this sense, Japan's financial crisis is something that could be predicted.
7 Yukihiko Endo, NRI Quarterly, (Tokyo, July 1998) P22-24
U III U _____
Exhibit 2: Share and Land Prices
Source: Japan Real Estate Institute
The issue of disclosure complicated the problematic volume of non-performing loans. Only a
few years have passed since Japanese banks began to disclose their non-performing assets.
Even though there were standards for disclosure, the standards did not force banks to disclose
certain data and bank officials easily manipulated data regarding bank performance. The
published figures for non-performing assets were intentionally underestimated because bank
officials and government officials were afraid of creating panic that would cause a loss of public
confidence in the financial system. Although the regulatory authorities had been trying to
persuade banks to merge and commit their own capital in order to save the weaker ones, the
sounder banks and insurance companies being called on to do the rescuing did not trust the
published figures----presumably because they knew that the figures were not accurate. An
actual example' is the aborted merger between Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Hokkaido Bank.
Skepticism about the scale of the former non-performing assets led to the merger being called
off and the ultimate collapse of one of Japan's city banks.
The volume of non-performing loans that emerged after the bank collapsed turned out to be
double the published one. Also, the figures for non-performing assets recently published by the
banks based on self-assessment were apparently more than triple the previously published
figures---even allowing for the fact that the definition of non-performing assets was different
from the previous one<Exhibit 3>. There is a definition of non-performing assets, but the fact
that people do not or can not know what the situation really is only exacerbates their concern.
Yukihiko Endo, NRI Quarterly, (Tokyo, July 1998) P22-24
Exhibit 3: Trial Self-assessment of the Quality of Bank Loan Assets (Aggregate Figures)
(dollars)
Total outstanding loans
Category I Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
City, long term, and trust banks 3.69 trillion 3.23 trillion 387.19 billion 59.24 billion 17.98 billion
Top-tier regional banks 1.19 trillion 1.07 trillion 111.63 billion 8.53 billion 3.45 billion
Second-tier regional banks 461.78 billion 394.17 billion 59.21 billion 6.79 billion 1.62 billion
Total 5.34trillion 4.69 billion 558.03 billion 74.57 billion 23.04billion
Note: Category 1= Sound, performing; Category 2= Substandard(requiring additional monitoring
effort); Category 3= Doubtful; Category 4= Value impaired
Source: Nomura Research Institute
The Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) was introduced in April 1998 when many banks began
reporting losses and depleting their equity as a result of writing off non-performing assets. To
comply with the new law, banks began to make efforts to recover their loan assets. This led to a
credit crunch, which ended up increasing non-performing assets.
The aim of the of the PCA is to enable the authorities to spot potential problems at an earlier
stage, e.g., by monitoring criteria such as equity ratios, and to take appropriate action before
banks actually collapse. Banks have therefore had to set up their own internal systems for
rating borrowers, and this has made them extremely cautious about extending new loans and led
them to try to recover existing ones. Many observers, including politicians who are supported
by small-sized companies, argued that PCA was introduced at an improper time and should have
been postponed.9
9 Yukihiko Endo, NRI Quarterly, (Tokyo, July 1998) P22-24
DIFFICULTIES IN SOLVING THE BAD DEBT PROBLEM'0
Since March 1998, banks and other financial institutions in Japan have had bad loans for real
estate equivalent to $500 billion, according to information form the Ministry of Finance.
However, it is often said that Japanese banks have $800 billion of non-performing real estate
loans. There is an urgent need to tackle the bad debt problem. However there are some
obstacles to solving bad loan problems such as time-consuming foreclosure process and
"minimum foreclosure price."
1. Time-consuming Foreclosure Process
If a foreclosure process was effective, banks would have exercised their recourse right and
gotten their money back. However, this was not the case in Japan. First of all, there was court
congestion. Second, in Japanese history, not many foreclosure filings had been made within a
short time period. Therefore, Japanese courts could not accept so many filings from financial
institutions. Especially, Tokyo and Osaka District Court were notorious for court congestion.
In some cases, it took more than two years to complete the foreclosure process.
2. Minimum Foreclosure Price
Another problem is that in the foreclosure process, the Japanese court decides on a minimum
foreclosure price based on an appraisal. If the actual bid is lower than this price, the foreclosure
sale is not accepted. Since it takes a long time to complete the foreclosure process, the real
estate market level may fall below the minimum foreclosure price determined at the first stage
of the foreclosure process. This may have further delayed the completion of foreclosure
process.
"'Goldman Sachs, Japan Research, (Tokyo, May 1998) P3-6
Resolving Japan's bad debt crisis can be achieved partially through the disposition of the real
estate collateral, with a vital part to be played by debt forgiveness or giving up loans made to
borrowers. However, there are number of reasons why banks did not chose debt forgiveness.
3. About Debt Forgiveness
The government's action in March 1998 for monitoring banks before they end up having a large
number of non-performing loans is an appropriate move. The key question is whether the banks
will actually respond to the government's action to a significant degree.
If a lending bank is a senior lender, the bank can get some money back regardless of current
depreciation of land prices after the real estate bubble. However, if a lending bank is one of
many subordinate lenders collateralizing the same property of a borrower, a lending bank has a
high risk of not receiving any money that it lent. In such a case, there is no merit to holding
such non-performing loans theoretically. Rather, it is to a bank's advantage to forgive debts: a
bank can increase the return over asset ratio (ROA") and improve its balance sheet. However,
there are some reasons banks did not give debt forgiveness as follows: 1) if they allow debt
forgiveness, the amount that they 'forgive' or 'lose' would be published publicly; 2) if the debt
is collateralized by the real estate, banks may want to wait until the condition of real estate
market improves and the once-plummeted land prices recover since current land prices in Japan
seem to be at the bottom; 3) Japanese banks mistakenly believed until recently that the real
estate market could recover within a reasonable time period and that they would be able to
Return over asset ratio = (net income + net tax or interest expense) / average total assets. A higher ROA indicates a
better performance on the company's management and leads to higher stock prices and higher bond rating of the
company.
withstand it until the recovery by taking advantage of hidden assets in their portfolio (Fukumi-
Eki 2 ). Furthermore; 4) under Japanese taxation, banks needed to prove the possible loss
amount to obtain a tax deduction for the grant for debt forgiveness. In most cases, banks have
to use an appraisal report to show the value of the collateral. However, there was a difference
between appraisal value and actual market value of real estate. This caused difficulties in
getting a full tax deduction for enough grants for debt forgiveness. Clearly, banks did not want
to choose debt forgiveness without a tax deduction, so they preferred to defer dealing with non-
performing loans.
4. Problems Associated with Selling Collateralized Real Estate
There are a number of obstacles to the sale of collateralized real estate because they often
include:
" Properties without permission to develop, such as farmlands that can not be converted to
commercial properties.
* Properties without construction permission, such as urbanization controlled area, and
irregularly shaped land that is not appropriate for development.
" Leased land; collateralized leased land must follow a complex process when being
foreclosed.
" Conflicts among mortgagees; even if the senior lender wants to foreclose the property
immediately, subordinate lenders often do not agree since they are unlikely to collect loan
value from the foreclosure because of the plummeted land price after the Bubble Economy.
Mortgagors involved may have conflicts in deciding whether to foreclose the property, and
1 Fukumi-Eki, or hidden asset is created by the difference between book value and the market value of a company's
asset. A company's hidden asset increased during the Bubble Economy when the company's property value (market
value) increased significantly.
if so, when they should do so.
Besides property issues, there are other problems facing investors and realtors.
* A limited number of buyers for loan collateral; generally speaking, buyers of property are
composed of individual investors and corporate investors. The percentage of individual
investors remained at 60%-65%" of all property investors during 1990-1993. However,
corporate investors declined significantly from 24% in 1990 to 14% in 1993.
* Land developers' reluctance to buy more land; generally, collateralized real estate is sold to
both individual and corporate investors via realtors and construction dealers. However, the
overall amount of properties obtained by them decreased significantly from $494 billion
(59.3 trillion yen) in 1990 to $332 billion (39.9 trillion) in 199314. The reasons for this
decrease are following; 1) a small number of properties that attract developers, since most
land prices are expected to fall further, making developers reluctant to buy properties at
this moment; 2) the developers' own lack of funds because of the collapse of land price;
and 3) the current lack of investors interested in property investment because of the
collapse of the "land myth".
INEFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURE: THE COOPERATION CREDIT PURCHASING
AGENC
The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) contributed to resolving the U.S. Savings and Loan
Crisis through liquidating or reorganizing failed savings banks. Getting some ideas from the
RTC, the Japanese Government created CCPC in January 1993 for the purpose of solving bad
loan problems. Although CCPC was a good start to solve the bad debt problems, it has not
Bank Study Corporation (Ginkou Kensyuu-sya), Liquidating Real Estate Collateral, (Tokyo, July 1995) p27
14 Bank Study Corporation (Ginkou Kensyuu-sya), Liquidating Real Estate Collateral, (Tokyo, July 1995) p29
contributed enough to banks' disposing non-performing loans.
The mechanism of CCPC is that: 1) banks sell bad loans secured by real estate to CCPC' 5 based
on the value of collateral; 2) the selling bank makes a loan to CCPC to fund the purchase of bad
loan to CCPC, so that even though CCPC buys bad loans of banks, the selling bank provides the
source of funds to purchase the bad loans; 3) the bank continues to service and handle all the
negotiations and processing of the bookings after the sale of their bad loans to CCPC; 4) when a
debtor of loans sells real estate collateral, CCPC receives income from the debtor, and CCPC
pays it back to a bank that sold bad loans to CCPC; and 5) financial institutions can take
advantage of this system by realizing the loss, and receiving a tax deduction for the realized loss
based on the value of the collateral.
Although banks can sell bad loans to CCPC, the problem is that the liquidity of loan collateral
has remained very low. In other words, loan collaterals are not sold off significantly.
Initially, banks sold bad debts to CCPC at discounted prices. If CCPC can sell the real estate
collateral at the same price it was bought from banks, there is no problem. However, in many
cases, CCPC has to sell a real estate collateral at a lower price' 6 . Therefore CCPC must realize
the loss from the sale of loan collateral. Again, since CCPC is financed by banks that originally
sold bad debts to CCPC, CCPC's loss directly affects these banks negatively. For those banks
that can cover the large loss, selling loan collateral at a discounted price is fine. It is certainly
better than getting no money back. However, if banks cannot cover the loss from the sale of
CCPC's real estate collateral, banks will fail. It is true that if only the price of real estate
1s In September 1998, CCPC purchased bad loans of banks equivalent to $500 million at the overall price of $50.4
million (10% of the $500 million approximately).
16 Property prices need to reach the discount cash flow (DCF) level to find buyers. Prices at DCF level
often indicate much lower property prices than those during the Bubble Economy.
collateral goes down, there would be some investors to buy it. However, neither CCPC nor
banks want to sell their loan collateral at a super discount price. CCPC can expedite writing off
of bad debts from a bank's accounting book, but it is not able to promote the sale of collateral
sufficiently.
The Japanese government should consider compensating for the loss from the sale of loan
collateral to increase the liquidity of mortgaged real estate. Without government funding, it is
unlikely that CCPC can sell loan collateral at a lower price to find buyers.
In September 1998, CCPC bought bad debts whose values are $488 million (58.6 billion yen) at
the price of $49 million (190 million yen) which is approximately 10% of the original value.
Since the inauguration of its operation in April 1993, CCPC has bought bad debts that amount
to $11.6 billion (1.39 trillion yen) in value. However, this is only 2.32'7 of the entire bad loans
that Japanese financial institutions have. Needless to say, CCPC is not sufficient to cope with
the bad debt problem of Japanese financial institutions since it could not promote the disposal of
bad debts to a significant degree. It remains to be seen if CCPC can get funding from the
government to cover the loss from the sale of loan collateral, and starts working efficiently.
THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERES SECURITIZATION AS A MEANS
TO SOLVE BAD DEBT PROBLEMS
Earlier in this chapter, I have described the complexities and obstacles associated with solving
the Japanese bad debt problems. The Japanese financial crisis is becoming worse day by day
because of the delayed solution to the bad debt problems.
17 2.32% is based on the official number of $500 billion non-performing loans.
In Japan, "securitization" is one of the most recent buzzwords. This is because Japanese
authorities are considering allowing the use of special purpose companies (SPCs) as part of the
process of securitizing loans as well as the use of public funds to act as a guarantee. The
government came up with using the securitization technique of the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) to dispose of non-performing loans. However, the debate is often being held without a
clear definition of the economic meaning of "securitization." In most cases, the government
considers securitization a means of disposing of non-performing loans.
FEATURES OF CONVENTIONAL SECURITIZED PRODUCTS"
Since the Japanese government now shows strong interest in securitization, one may think that
there is no history of securitization in Japan. The issue of mortgage-backed securities, however,
targeting residential mortgages and housing loans boasts a long history. Nevertheless, only for
the last ten years has Japan debated the question of converting commercial real estate to
securities as investment products.
In 1987, for the first time in Japan, small-denomination real estate financial products were sold
to multiple investors with shared real estate equity. After that all real estate companies sold
similar commodities which, based on the premise of rising land prices, were touted for their tax
advantages (income tax advantages for income assessment, depreciation merits, and inheritance
tax evaluation advantages). Law did, however, restricted transfers between individuals.
Later, partnership-type securitized products arose from developers qualified as special real
estate joint ventures under '95 Corporate Law. These also had minimal liquidity.
18 Masanori Oka, NLI Research Reports, (Tokyo, April 1998), p2
Apart from this trend towards small-denomination products in the property industry, we find the
recent involvement of financial bodies in processing bad debts by converting them to securities.
The system that has been developed is complex and is limited to corporate investors and
therefore, does not offer liquidity. It also ultimately requires the disposal through sale of
mortgaged property and the risk of price falls at this time affects banks and similar institutions
negatively<Exhibit 4>.
Exhibit 4: List of Recent Securities Issued by Financial Institutions
Date Name of Banks Sum Converted Risk of Price Drop for
Issued ($ millions) Security Targeted Property
Jul-95 Former Mitsubishi 71 Real Estate 70% covered by bank trusts
Jul-96 Tokyo Mitsubishi 71 Real Estate 100% covered by banks, etc.
Aug-96 Fuji Bank 29 Real Estate 100% covered by banks, etc.
Sep-96 Sanwa Bank 214 Loans 100% covered by third party
Dec-96 Nippon Credit 23 Real Estate 100% covered by banks, etc.
Mar-97 Asahi 81 Loans 100% covered by banks, etc.
Mar-97 Tokyo Mitsubishi 36 Loans Investors
Total $525
Source: Kazuo Sato, Monthly Economist (April 29, 1997)
In principle, securitized real estate products, like other financial products, should retain their
small size (for mass use) and liquidity to allow free buying and selling by a large number of
investors including individual investors. However, conventionally there has been a limited
number of investors in real estate investment products and securitized products from real estate
collateral of non-performing loans. This is due to the fact that these products are only sold to a
limited number of institutional investors and they are not very liquid.
An overall policy to free up mortgaged real estate in March '97, deals with barriers to
securitization in the tax system, laws, and regulations by calling for reforms limited to the non-
performing loans and real estate collateral held by financial institutions. While this may set the
ball rolling with regards to financial institutions' disposing of their non-performing loans, what
happens in reality is to remove the real estate collateral from balance sheets for a certain period,
which postpones the reporting of losses. Unless the real estate market conditions improve in the
future, it is likely that buyers won't appear and therefore, banks will have to buy the loans back.
The goal of real estate securitization is not to protect realtors or rescue financial institutions but
to create an attractive market and property investment products for both domestic and foreign
investors. This is why we need to create full-scale security products that are freely available for
purchase and transfer.
SIMILAR CRISIS IN THE BANKING SYSTEM, BUT NOT QUITE
There is a close parallel between the U.S. in 1988 as it struggled to solve its savings and loan
crisis (the S&L Crisis) and Japan in 1998 as it tackles the ailing banking system with huge bad
debt problems. Since the U.S. overcame the S&L Crisis, it must offer a road map for Japan's
solution' 9. To find a solution to the bad debt problems resulting from the plummeted land prices
in the1990s, the Japanese government followed in the footsteps of the U.S. by imitating what
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) did. The RTC was a United States-government-
sponsored corporation created by the Financial Institutions Reform Act of 1989 in order to clean
Richard W. Stevenson, Tailoring the S&L Crisis To Save Japan's Banks, The New York Times, (New York,
October 18, 1998)
up the S&L disasters of the late 1980s. The RTC was in charge of disposing of insolvent S&L
assets. The means and strategies used by the RTC to liquidate the assets paved the way for
large-scale securitization. RTC sold securities backed by pools of commercial mortgages
(commercial mortgage backed securities, or CMBSs) through investment bankers to a wide
range of mortgage investors20.
There are many lessons above for combating the woes of the Japanese financial system.
However, it is thoughtless to expect that Japan can fix its financial system as nicely and easily
as the U.S. did, using exactly the same strategy as the RTC. One of the main reasons is the
difference in scale. Japanese banks have much more non-performing loans relative to the size
of the economy than U.S. S&Ls ever had. The second reason is that in the case of the RTC, it
dealt with only a part of the banking system, which is the savings and loan industry that focused
on real estate and real estate lending. The U.S. did not have to face what Japan is facing with its
entire banking system being subject to the effect of non-performing loans21. The third reason is
that the Japanese government waited long enough to solve the banking system crisis, that it
worsened the situation. Because of the government's late action, the cost borne by taxpayers in
Japan might be at least $400 billion while the S&L Crisis cost borne by U.S. tax payers was
roughly $130 billion. According to Bert Ely, a banking consultant in Alexandria, Virginia, "If
they had dealt with it five or six years ago, it would have cost what U.S. S&L situation costr."
The Japanese government much prefers a "harmonious solution"- that is, to try to save almost
all banks. However, it is inevitable that the government and people have to choose a painful
solution such as allowing some insolvent banks to fail in order to clean up decay underlying the
20 Masato Tanaka, A New Approach To Solving Japan's Real Estate Crisis, (Massachusetts, July 1998)
21 Ikuo Anai, Solving Bank Crisis Means Pain But Also Gain, The Daily Yomiuri, (Tokyo, October 6, 1998)
22 Melissa Wahl, Japanese Confront Enormous Bank Tab, Chicago Tribute, (Illinois, September 19, 1998)
Japanese banking system. Finally, the fourth reason is that there are many peculiar factors to
Japan's real estate market that block securitization of real estate collateral as follows: 1) leasing
Code; 2) too many real estate regulations; 3) lack of information about rents; 4) absence of the
secondary market; 5) Tax system, and; 6) servicers. I will detail these factors later in Chapter 4.
Whether Japan can actually restructure its banking industry and get over the seven-year
recession depends on the Japan's ability to come up with tailor-made tactics combined with
lessons learned from the U.S., and the ability to take action. Even if it is painful to the
government, the banking industry and the taxpayers, it must be done.
SECURITIZATION IS NOT A QUICK AND EASY SOLUTION
If non-performing loans are to attract investors, they will have to trade at a considerable
discount, requiring the current holder of the loan assets to write off a loss from their sale.
However, these assets tend to be accounted for in an unclear manner, and asset holders tend not
to want to take a loss on their sale. Furthermore, there must exist a group of institutional
investors capable of accurately judging risk and return of securitized products. Creating a
mechanism that makes securitization possible is indispensable.
It seems that the government expects too much of securitization as a solution to the bad debt
problem. The government short-term objective to develop an asset securitization system mainly
stems from the expectation for what securitization can bring to the banking industry. However,
the government is too myopic about the potential of securitization. Securitization should not be
restricted to disposing of non-performing loans. As its long-term objective, the government
should also consider securitizing sound assets that accompany cash flow more aggressively.
Otherwise, a secondary market for securitized products will not develop efficiently.
THE DIRECTION OF THIS THESIS
This thesis points out the Japanese government's insufficient consideration of securitization as a
merely technique to solve the bad debt problems. The government's perspective of the potential
of securitization is clearly narrow and it is viewed in a short-term frame. However, rather than
expecting securitization as a solution for bad debt problems, the government should evaluate
more broadly what securitization can do for the Japanese economy in a long run: 1) promote a
shift from indirect financing to direct financing; 2) expose Japan's individual assets to a more
efficient type of investment opportunities; 3) increase real estate transactions; 4) increase
liquidity of real estate including collateral and; 5) bring new businesses into the real estate
industry.
CHAPTER 2: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. S&L CRISIS AND AN OVERVIEW OF REAL
ESTATE SECURITIZATION
Chapter 2 will describe: 1) lessons obtained from the U.S. S&L Crisis; 2) the RTC's way of
handling the financial crisis; 3) an overview of asset securitization; and 4) securitization of real
estate.
THE U.S. S&L CRISIS
Before Japan faced its current banking crisis, the U.S. banking and S&L industry in the early
1980s faced one of its own financial crisis. This was of a magnitude not seen since the Great
Depression of the early thirties when 9755 banks were closed with deposits worth $1.4 billion
lost'.
Except for the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company (Continental), and the
New York savings banks, the early 1980s's bank and thrift failures were mostly small
institutions, many with roots in the agricultural or energy sectors. Continued trouble in the
energy sector and a collapse of several real estate markets increased the number of banking
failures.
Between 1980 and 1994, 1,617 federally insured banks with assets equivalent to $302.6 billion,
either collapsed or received financial assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). During the same period, 1,295 savings and loan institutions with $621 billion in assets
were closed by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) or the RTC, or
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, The First Fifty Years, A History of the FDIC 1933-1983, ( Washington,
D.C., FDIC 1984)
received FSLIC financial assistance.
"The failure of 2,912 federally insured depository institutions is equivalent to one failure every
other day over the 15-year period. The combined total of $924 billion in assets from the failed
institutions is equivalent to $168 million in failed bank or savings and loan assets that had to be
liquidated or otherwise resolved each day for the 15-year period. The timing of the bank and
savings and loan failures between 1980 and 1994, however, was not evenly distributed. At the
height of the crisis, which was the five-year period between 1988 and 1992, a bank or savings
and loan failed on an average of once a day, bringing with it a daily influx of $385 million in
assets."2
COMBATING FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE RTC'S WAY 3
Between August 1989 and December 1995, during the RTC's existence, the agency was in
charge of resolving 747 insolvent thrifts with assets totaling $402.6 billion. The cost to
taxpayers resulting from RTC's clean up activity was approximately $87.5 billion.
It is worth knowing how the RTC dealt with the S&L Crisis. The actions taken by the RTC to
clean up the S&Ls made a great contribution to practices in the field of securitization in the U.S.
In the first place, the RTC used various techniques to deal with insolvent institutions, including
the sales of whole institutions and of individual securities, ranging from treasury paper to so-
called "junk bonds." In addition, they sold other assets in "whole loan" style, which required
neither conversion to a security nor a program of "bulk sales" in which investors were offered
"pools" of assets (usually real estate). The pools of assets, some of that were well performing
and some non-performing, were sold at the market value. Mainly, investment banks or investors
2 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Managing the Crisis, The FDIC and RTC Experience 1980-1994,
(Washington, D.C., August 1998)
3 OECD, Securitization, An International Perspective, p.28, (Paris, May 1995)
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who wished to obtain managerial control over the asset purchased the pools of assets. At some
point, the RTC leaned that the purchasers were later securitizing a large share of the assets,
using "repackaging" operations.
After April 1992, direct securitization took precedence for the RTC, as a disposing method of
assets. Although some mortgages were qualified to be included in the pools of the Government
National Mortgage Corporation ("Ginnie Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation ("Freddy Mac"), the largest part of the assets were sold under RTC "private label",
commercial mortgage obligation (CMO), for single-family mortgages. "These securities
received credit enhancement from subordination and overcollateraliation and through reverse
funds which the RTC was pledged to maintain, provided losses remained below certain levels 4".
From the first, it has consumer receivables that were relatively easy to securitize. Somewhat
more different claims were eventually securitized in large numbers, including single-family
mortgages with high delinquency rates and pools of multi-unit residential mortgages. Most of
the RTC's securized products were rated AA or AAA.
After having cleaned up the easily saleable assets, the RTC encountered problems because
remaining assets became increasingly harder to dispose of. This trend was similar to those that
have hindered commercial mortgage securitization in a number of ways: the large size of
individual loans, the highly specific terms which limit homogeneity and transferability, the
problems in developing reliable payment histories, and the difficulties encountered in obtaining
acceptable diversification. Nevertheless, having rated the different tranches of these securities
from AAA (the highest) to BBB (the lowest for investment), the RTC was able to securitize
pools of commercial mortgages with credit enhancement. Some were given fixed rates, others
4 OECD, Securitization, And International Perspective, p.29, (Paris, May 1995 )
floating rates. The RTC still needed to sell a great number of non-performing or
"underperforming" mortgages. These mortgages required foreclosure and/or renegotiations of
terms, in a similar way to real estate directly owned by the RTC, which, as a result of
foreclosures, were consolidated in "structured transactions." The RTC sold an asset at an
estimated market value, which was below book value, and the investor assumed control over the
asset with a potential for its appreciation, provided that the assets were managed properly.
Although higher-rated tranches such as AA or AAA were widely sold, less saleable assets,
especially these in the subordinated tranches, were mainly distributed to single investors who
wished to keep control over the assets or maximize rates of recovery on their assets.
The RTC developed methods for liquidating insolvent institutions, which may have wider
applicability and may make it possible to sell huge assets that don't have good marketability. It
is widely believed that the prices received through securitization compare advantageously with
those received from alternative financing methods.
WHAT IS SECURITIZATION?: OVERVIEW OF ASSET SECURITIZATION
To understand accurately the tactics of securitization, which the RTC used, it is important to
understand the mechanism of asset securitization.
"Asset backed securitization is the pooling of assets which have an income stream and the
repackaging of those assets in the form of marketable securities, for sale to investors. The
assets themselves or the income arising from them collateralizes the securities. The income
from the assets is the primary source of payment of income or interest to the investors. The
effective packaging of portfolios can create securities that are particularly suited to the needs of
investors. In many cases, the securitized investments are more marketable and attractive to
investors than the underlying assets supporting the structure. The most usual types of asset to
be securitized are those which generate regular and relatively certain income stream, which
have standard terms, a historically low delinquency and loss experience and which are
appropriately serviced. However, assets which do not satisfy all these criteria can also be
securitized successfully 5 ." Assets that can be securitized include: real property mortgages, loan
receivables, credit card receivables, income-producing real estate as well as, and any asset,
which generates a regular or predictable income.
Asset backed securitization first began in the U.S. with the development of the secondary
mortgage market that grew rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s. The U.S. government made an
effort to create a secondary market for residential mortgage loans; this encouraged banks and
S&Ls to sell, and then later to securitize their mortgage portfolios. The techniques that were
used in the securitization of bank assets were later adapted to the securitization of almost all
types of assets.
The first issuers of mortgage-backed securitized bonds emerged from US government initiatives
in the 1970s, namely: the Government National Mortgage Corporation ("Ginnie Mae") and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddy Mac").
Residential mortgages are the most common assets that are securitized today while large
markets have been created for commercial mortgages, auto loans, consumer loans and credit
card receivables.
5 Adrienne Showering, et al., "The Growth of Asset Securitization in Asia Pacific", Asset Securitization in Asia, p3,
(Hong Kong, 1997 )
OVERVIEW OF SECURITIZATION OF REAL ESTATE IN JAPAN
1. The System of Securitization of real estate in Japan
In real estate securitization, a real estate operator (capital procurement body) converts the
ownership or profit rights from real estate properties into negotiable securities through a conduit
(special security issuing body), and sells them to investors <Exhibit 5>. This system is
identical to that in which investors purchase regular shares and bonds with a view to procuring
dividends and interest. The conduit is made up of special purpose investment companies or
groups and is not subject to taxation. Interest and principal are repaid to investors, similar to
other securities. Investors including individuals should be able to freely buy and sell the
securities. However, real estate investment products and securitized mortgaged real estate of
non-performing loans are only available to a limited number of investors and therefore, illiquid.
Exhibit 5: Basic System of Securitization of Real Estate
Source: NLI
2. Proposed Regulatory Changes
To promote more securitization, the Japanese Government have made several changes to be
incorporated intro trust and special-purpose company (SPC) structures to securitize real estate
6
and loans backed by real estate in Japan. These changes include the following
a. Trusts
* Redefine trust certificates that represent an interest in a pool of corporate loans
collateralized by real estate as securities under the Securities & Exchange Law.
" Exempt the transfer of real estate intro a trust and the corresponding sale of trust
certificates from certain taxes imposed on land sales.
b. SPC
" Permit special-purpose companies to purchase bank loans.
" Introduce a Uniform Commercial Code-like system within 1998 to permit the SPC's
security interest in loans to be legally perfected.
" Pass legislation for establishing SPCs that will address tax and Japanese Commercial Code
problems, including minimum capital requirements, corporate income tax, real estate
capital gains tax, and registration taxes.
3. Market Impact
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) and other governmental agencies have started working on all
the proposed initiatives. However, it may be later than 1999 before many of the initiatives
become laws. The impact of those initiatives on the market in a long run include the following'.
6 Moody's Investors Service "Structured Finance: Special Report," (Tokyo, August 1998), p2
7 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the U.S. offers the buyer of financial assets with the ability to secure its
claim to the specified assets by financing statement with the secretary of state or other designated public official.
8 Moody's Investors Service "Structured Finance: Special Report," (Tokyo, August 1998), p3
a. Special-Purpose Vehicles
The U.S. tax code has specific provisions, such as real estate mortgage investment conduits
(REMICs) and real estate investment trusts (REITs), which make it easier to securitize assets by
eliminating SPV level taxes. On the other hand, the Japanese tax and commercial codes were
not made for SPCs or trusts to act only as asset financing or selling vehicles between issuers and
investors. The proposed regulatory changes implicate supports for decreasing SPV level
taxation, lowering capital requirements, and removing other restrictions. Furthermore,
establishing a legal infrastructure for SPCs and trusts to act as single-purpose vehicles in Japan
will promote bankruptcy-remoteness by decreasing potential SPV obligations irrelevant to the
securitization.
b. Liquidity
Liquidity for real estate backed instruments will increase by making trust certificates similar to
securities and by creating a secondary market. Unfortunately, there has not been much progress
in measures to reduce the cost and the time necessary for foreclosure and the sale of real estate
collateral in Japan. The liquidity of real estate collateral and complexities among lien holder
continue to be serious problems.
c. Security
The introduction of an Uniformed Commercial Code-like system can greatly facilitate asset-
backed securitization in Japan. "The difficulty in establishing a secured interest in financial
obligations has been a major deterrent to Japanese securitization. The Specified Credit Law
(Tokusai-ho) for perfecting a security interest in monetary obligations did help certain asset
types (e.g., auto loans and leases). However, for such assets as real estate loans, which do not
come under the law, the perfection process can be a deal breaker because each debtor must be
notified or must consent to the sale of identified existing receivables. If expanded to include
other forms of corporate debt (trade receivables and unsecured bank loans), efficient filing of
security interests could stimulate a large potential asset pool and help refocus Japanese
securitization on asset strength and not on seller guarantees"1.
d. Credit Enhancement
"By opening up credit enhancement to property and casualty insurers, more innovative support
structures will be made available. In the short term, however, the danger is that insurers will be
an additional crutch to wrap poorly disclosed real estate assets in corporate guarantees - again
hampering the development of securities based on real estate performance."' 0
e. Information
The proposed initiatives put an emphasis on disclosure rules and a market valuation system.
However, concrete measures have not been announced yet, except the development of databases
on real estate held by the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Corporation (CCPC), and general
information about rents of commercial real estate.
4. Securitization's Focus
a. Residential or Commercial?
"Despite the securitization-friendly nature of residential mortgages (uniform collateral/loan
pools and a large number of diverse obligors), securitization efforts in Japan have centered on
commercial (not residential) real estate finance. The reason commercial real estate has taken
the lead is because it is at the heart of Japan's bad debt crisis, and both the Japanese government
and the business want action.
Fifty five percent of the total Japanese individual assets equivalent to 10 trillion dollars is kept
in bank accounts, which provides financial institutions with a dependable, low-cost funding
source. Therefore, contrary to the United States experience, Japanese financial institutions
9 Moody's Investors Service "Structured Finance: Special Report," (Tokyo, August 1998), p3
0) Moody's Investors Service, "Structured Finance: Special Report," (Tokyo, August 1998), p4
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(both private and public) have generally been content to retain and fund residential mortgage
pools on their balance sheets. The same, however, cannot be said for commercial mortgage
debt. The issue here is not one of funding, but of asset risk and liquidity. Commercial real
estate - traditionally a high price volatile asset - has been on an uncontrollable roller coaster
ride in Japan over the past 10 years. This is the problem regulators appear most anxious to
confront. As a result, Japan's initial forays into securitization have been backed by relatively
undiversified commercial real estate holdings or large loans collateralized with commercial real
estate - a trend that is likely to continue.
Will large-scale residential MBS ever take hold in Japan? To date, most analysts have
considered it to be unlikely; however, deregulation and Japan's Housing Loan Corporation
(HLC), a government-owned home mortgage lender, may soon change that.
The U.S. model for stimulating home ownership is to provide private mortgage originators with
a low-cost funding source through guaranteed home mortgage backed securities issued by
Fannie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). The model and the market that followed are
credited with establishing asset securitization in the United States.
On the other hand, the Japanese government also intervenes to promote real estate development
and home ownership; however, it takes a far different approach. With deposits of $1.8 trillion
(Y225 trillion) from the postal savings system, the Japanese government directly competes as a
residential mortgage lender through Japan's Housing Loan Corporation (HLC), which in recent
years have held a massive 41% share of the residential mortgage credit outstanding in Japan.
Stimulating residential mortgage lending through funded loans, in contrast to indirect support
for loan securitization, has been a key structural factor in preventing residential MBS
development in Japan.
The situation, however, may soon change. Government officials recently announced their
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intentions to securitize part of the HLC's huge residential mortgage portfolio to reduce its
dependence on postal savings for funding. Depending on the scale, that would not only provide
an excellent foundation for an MBS market in Japan, but it could also stimulate investor interest
in other securitized products.
A move by non-government mortgage lenders to incorporate mortgage backed securities as a
funding alternative in Japan will likely depend on the degree to which deregulation (i.e.,
increased investment opportunities) and the disintermediation, which will result, will cut into
the banks' deep deposit base. The shrinking deposit base of mortgage originators (banks and
savings and loans) brought on by deregulation and by the corresponding competition for
investment funds was a driving force in U.S. residential mortgage securitization.""
b. Debt or Equity?
In the U.S. market, equity REITs and mortgage REITs, REMICs (offering both debt and residual
equity investment), MBS and CMBS provide a wide range of securitization alternatives. The
Japanese government indicates that it also seeks to create markets for securities backed by both
real estate equity and debt collateralized by real estate. In the past, transactions regarding
securitization were limited to certain preapproved parties. However, the needs of issuers and
investors would be better met if: 1) clear legal guidelines were provided; 2) structuring of these
guidelines were left to market forces.
Moody's Investors Service, "Structured Finance: Special Report," (Tokyo, August 1998), p.4 -5
CHAPTER 3: THE REAL ESTATE MARKET AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH SECURITIZATION
This chapter describes: 1) the trend of the commercial real estate investment market in Tokyo;
2) the need to enhance the liquidity level of the real estate market in Tokyo; 3) the structural
changes now occurring in the market; 4) the real implication of the falling land prices; 5) the
dual structure of land prices; 6) the institutional factors that blocked securitization; and 7) a
factor that is currently impeding securitization.
THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT MARKET IN TOKYO'
According to an announcement of the government's land price surveys in September 1997,
commercial property prices in central Tokyo rose for the first time since the collapse of property
markets at the end of the Bubble Economy. However, except for the superior properties, the
overall real estate market remains depressed. Many properties have no prospect of becoming
profitable, and many buildings remain vacant in spite of overall rent declines. There is not
much progress observed in the liquidation of non-performing loans and collateral of real estate,
and the entire real estate market in Japan remains uncertain in the midst of the recession. In
this chapter, I focus on trends in the Tokyo market, the nation's largest real estate market in
terms of real estate stock.
1. Trends in the Office Leasing Market
Vacancy rates in Tokyo's 23 central wards2 peaked in 1994 and continued to decline, reaching
Masanori Oka, NLI Research Reports. (Tokyo, April 1998), p1- 10
2 Metropolitan Tokyo is broadly divided into three areas: the 23 wards, which largely define the urbanized areas of
the city; western Tama district, which contains suburban cities, farm land and mountains; and a number of islands,
including the Bonin group, in the Pacific Ocean. The total area of the 23 wards is 618 square kilometers, or roughly
70 percent of land area of New York City.
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4.8% in 1997. While rents of large new buildings in central Tokyo finally bottomed out, rents
of smaller buildings in peripheral areas continue to fall <Exhibit 6 and 7>.
Office demand is high when three conditions are met: good location (central city, proximity to
train stations, etc.), good quality (new and well equipped) and large size (at least 3437.5 sqft).
The degree of demand for these buildings is due to their scarcity. According to the survey of the
National Land Agency, large buildings which were constructed after 1990 with a floor space of
at least 2,883 sqft consist of only 5% of the building stock in Tokyo's 23 wards.
Since the supply of new large office buildings is limited, demand for offices goes beyond the
superior properties described above to older, smaller buildings in good locations. However, the
demand for large buildings located away from the city center remains low. Therefore, it is
difficult to figure market conditions based on average values.
Exhibit 6: Offered Rent Index by Scale and Area
*1) Large-Scale Building: More Than 550,000 sqft of Total Floor Area
*2) Metropolitan 3 wards: Chiyoda, Chuo, and Minato
*3) Central 6 wards: Shinjuku, Shibuya, Shinagawa, Toshima, Bunkyo, and Taito
Source: Japan Real Estate Institute
Exhibit 7: Advertised Rent Indexes and Vacancy Rate
-E--Rent for large bldg -- Rent for small/mid-sized bldg.
Vacancy rate(right)
160 12.00%
140 10.00%
120
100 8. 00 %
80DB 6.00%
60 4.00% C
40
20 2.00%
0 0.00%
Note: Large buildings have at least 3,437.5 sqft: small & mid-sized buildings have less than
3,437.5 sqft.
Source: Office Building Research Institute for rents, and Ikoma Data Service System for vacancy rate
Offered Rent Index by Scale and Area (Sep. 1997)
2. Trends of Demand for Office Buildings
Judging from recent declines in the vacancy rate, office demand is increasing. However, this
increase relies heavily on the falling rents. And since rents of good buildings seem to have
reached the bottom, growth in future demand may be less likely.
However, while the future demand for office buildings is unclear, the conditions sought for
office buildings are rising steadily. Because of the impact of a large-scale earthquake in Kobe
(Hanshin Big Earthquake) tenants are now seeking not only the three conditions of location,
newness, and size, but also resistance to large-scale earthquakes. This will create differences in
demand for buildings and location of buildings. Currently, one-third of the office building stock
in the Tokyo 23 Ward area does not meet the latest standards of earthquake resistance and thus
is significantly exposed to risks arising from potential natural disasters. <Exhibit 8>
Demand patterns are also shifting by location. In the greater Tokyo metropolitan area, demand
for office buildings appear to be returning to office districts in the central Tokyo. The return to
the central Tokyo area can be explained by companies' reevaluation of the advantages of
economic concentration in central areas where real estate prices have currently fallen.
According to a survey by the National Land Agency in 1996, 51 % of the companies in the 23
Ward area recognized advantages to an economic concentration in central areas, including
proximity to their customers and richness of information that companies need for their business.
Exhibit 8: Office Stock in the 23-Ward Area of Tokyo (January 1, 1994)
Source: NLI
3. Trend in Commercial Land Prices
In July 1997, Standard land prices of Shinjuku and Ginza showed their first increase since 1991.
Those two districts are among ten of the 171 commercial districts in the five central wards in
Tokyo, namely, Chioda-ku, Chuo-ku, Minato-ku, Shinjuku-ku, and Shibuya-ku.
The land value in Shinjuku-ku rose in January 1997 while the land value of Chioda-ku and
Chuo-ku rose as of July 1997. These three locations are among the most expensive districts in
Tokyo (valued at over 7 million yen per sq. meter). The trend of these three districts may
indicate that the reversal in land prices is a phenomenon of prime real estate in Tokyo.
According to the National Land Agency, each ward's variable coefficient3 of commercial land
prices in the five central wards, namely, Chioda-ku, Chuo-ku, Minato-ku, Shinjuku-ku, and
Shibuya-ku, has risen notably since 1996 particularly for Chuo-ku. This indicates that
disparities in land prices are increasing in each ward depending on the area and specific
property. However, it remains unclear if the price reversal observed in prime properties will
spread to other areas.
4-a. Real Estate Auctions held by JNR Settlement Corporation4
In land auctions held by the JNR Settlement Corporation in the first half of 19975, even though
many properties in good location in central Tokyo received higher prices, surrounding land
prices were not affected very much6. Besides, because of the revival of the demand for office
buildings in central Tokyo, land prices in outlying areas such as Yokohama and Chiba continue
to decline.
Companies have recently been showing a strong interest in acquiring or constructing buildings
for their own use. The primary purpose of owning buildings varies, including reducing the cost
of rent, improving business efficiency by integrating operations, and establishing a flagship.
Looking at major building acquisitions and plans since 1995, the number of incidences is the
highest in 1997 at 44, but in terms of floor space, 1998 is the highest.
3 A measure of variance for comparison purposes; the standard deviation is divided by the mean value.
4 Japan National Railway Settlement Corporation was created to liquidate a large amount of debts made by the
former Japan National Railway Corporation before. This national railway corporation was privatized and now exists
as Japan Railway Corporation (JR).
5 JNR Settlement Corporation auctioned properties which were used be owned by the former publicly owned railway
company, Japan National Railway Corporation
6 NLI Research Institute Homepage, The Commercial investment Real Estate Market in Tokyo, (Tokyo,
1998), p7
One reason for this trend is the recent decline in commercial land prices. However, it is not
clear whether this trend will remain the same in the future because, long-term risks of owning
real estate and cost-effectiveness of leasing versus ownership will be determined by the future
condition of the real estate market in Japan, which is still in the adjustment phase at this
moment.
4-b. Real Estate Auctions held by the Tokyo District Court
According to the information of the Sanyu System Real Estate Finance Research Institute, in the
auctions aimed at liquidating real estate collateral of non-performing loans of financial
institutions, 100 properties were auctioned by the Tokyo District Court in the second half of
1996 (those auctions include that of vacant land, land with buildings, leased land, and
condominiums). The properties auctioned are foreclosed properties by financial institutions.
Forty-nine properties were sold through the auctions and the auction prices for these properties
were approximately 10% of the original collateral value7 . The buyers of these properties
include both individual and corporate investors. Financial institutions often hesitate to foreclose
their collateral since they know that they can only get back a small portion of the money they
lent to borrowers. Furthermore, if properties held as collateral are liquidated on a substantial
scale to mitigate the problem of non-performing loans, the value of collateral held by financial
institutions would be clarified publicly and real estate prices may fall further'. Because of these
situations, financial institutions tend to keep their non-performing loans since doing nothing
seems better than realizing a huge loss from selling their loan collateral. This problem also
7 NLI Research Institute Homepage, The Commercial Investment Real Estate Market in Tokyo, (Tokyo, February
1998), p8
8 NLI Research Institute Homepage, The Commercial Investment Real Estate Market in Tokyo, (Tokyo, February
1998), p8
links to the problem of the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Corporation (CCPC) referred to in
chapter I. CCPC can not sell mortgaged real estate at the current market price, which is
dramatically lower than the original loan value, because CCPC can not realize such a huge loss
from the sale of mortgaged real estate.
5. Real Estate Disposal by Companies
According to the trend of real estate transactions of Tokyo Stock Exchange listed companies
between 1993 and 1996, a significant increase in the number of transactions can be seen for
three years after 1994 <Exhibit 9>. These companies which are selling their properties include
financial institutions and insurance companies that invested in real estate exclusively during the
Bubble Economy. The supporting reason for the increase in selling their properties is
companies' effort to reduce debt and pursue restructuring <Exhibit 10>. Public agencies
account for 10%-20% of the purchases while most of the purchasers were affiliated companies
of the seller and other companies in the private sector such as foreign investment banks. They
seem to be buying these properties because of the much lower price in relation to the Bubble
Economy years, and because of the potential profit that they will be able to earn by securitizing
these properties in the near future. It is expected that the disposal of real estate holdings will
stay at a high level for the time being because financial institutions especially continue to sell
their non-performing loans.
Exhibit 9: Sale of Properties by Companies
Number of Companies and Properties Disposed
300
250
200
150
100
50
0 # of properties
93 # of companies
Source: Ministry of Finance
Exhibit 10: Reasons for Selling Properties
50 100
# of companies answered
Reason 1:
Reason 2:
Reason 3:
Reason 4:
Reason 5:
Reason 6:
Reason 7:
Reason 8:
Complying with request from public development project, etc.
Relocation factory or business site
Transferring idle land to affiliated company
Transferring idle land to another company
Covering term loss
Improving financial condition by repaying loan, etc.
Restructuring by consolidating operations, raisingfunds for severance pay, etc.
Unclear
Source: NLI Research Institute
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6. Recent Trend of Securitization9
There is a growing interest in the Japanese real estate market among both domestic and foreign
financial institutions since the government's latest economic stimulus package worth $195
billion (24 trillion yen) includes measures to activate trading in real estate held as collateral by
Japanese banks which wish to dispose of non-performing loans. While bulk sales of real estate
backed claims to specialized investors overseas have been practiced in Japan, the securitization
of real estate, including condominiums and commercial buildings owned by construction
companies and realtors, is increasing rapidly. According to the survey done by Daiwa
Securities Co., the market value of real estate subject to liquidation is equivalent to $19 billion
(2.3 trillion yen) and approximately $8.3 billion (1 trillion yen) of real estate has already been
liquidated. Daiwa expects the size of such a market to expand to $664 billion (80 trillion yen)
in three years, if infrastructure for distribution of securitized products and reliable credit rating
system are well organized.
Foreign institutions provide real estate-related financing in the following three ways: 1) division
of real estate into smaller lots for revenue generating development; 2) pursuit of revenues from
tenants' security deposits and lease payments; and 3) loans to investors of collateral backed real
estate. In Japan, foreign investment banks are particularly promoting the third type of service in
conjunction with securitization. Even though securitization has so far been made for non-
performing loans of Japanese financial institutions, the practice has recently begun to involve
healthy properties. For instance, Goldman Sachs has securitized the building of Yamato Mutual
Life Insurance in one of the most expensive areas in downtown Tokyo. In this deal, Credit
Suisse First Boston Securities Japan Ltd. created real estate trusts on the properties and
9 Jiji Press Ltd., Tokyo Report, (Tokyo, May 11, 1998)
Goldman Sachs bought the entire trust beneficiary rights for $36 million (43.2 billion yen). The
vacancy rate is 0% and it is expected that the building on the property will generate 5% annual
return'0 . Other foreign investment banks are following suit in handling both performing and
non-performing assets.
The Government's stimulus package is expected to fuel securitization of real estate, using
know-how obtained by foreign investment banks. However, it is pointed out by investment
banks that securitization of non-performing loans without much cash flow has a limit. Healthy
properties that generate greater cash flows should be securitized at a more significant level.
Furthermore, current system of securitization does not offer liquidity of real estate at a required
level and does not allow individual investors to enter because of the high investment principal
required.
7. Implications of the Present Demands Made by Foreign Investment Banks for the
Demand of the Japanese Real Estate Market
The recent trend of foreign investment banks to purchase collateralized real estate implies that
there exists a demand in the real estate market. However, it is important to know that foreign
investment banks are not buying collateralized real estate in order to develop the property, but
buying as an investment. The reasons are follow:
1) Foreign investment banks see that this is a good time to buy Japanese real estate, especially,
properties that generate an income stream. They believe that the land prices have nearly hit
the bottom. Since the property has a potential "high market value", it is worth buying since
they can sell it at a higher price in the future.
Masato Tanaka, A New Approach to Solving Japan's Real Estate Crisis, (MIT, August 1998)
2) Foreign investment banks see great potential in real estate as a financial product.
Therefore, they buy these properties at current low prices to prepare for securitization.
Clearly, for foreign investment banks, this is an excellent moment for them to buy Japanese real
estate and enter the real estate industry, even though the domestic demand for Japanese real
estate is low. The domestic demand is low because many Japanese investors currently do not
have enough funds to invest in real estate. It is true that the price of real estate is nearly at the
bottom; even so, many developers cannot afford to buy property of good quality (properties that
generates great cash flow) and they cannot even borrow money because of the current credit
crunch. Therefore, foreign investment banks seem very active in the Japanese real estate
investment market.
THE REAL ESTATE MARKET NEEDS MORE LIQUIDITY"
When the real estate market soured in the late 1980s, many people claimed that strict regulation
and the legal system of land were deterring the efficient use of land, and requested relaxing plot
ratios, allowing development and agricultural land in urban areas, and revising the Land Lease
and Building Lease Acts. However, the plummeted land prices in 1991 changed the real
meaning of the "efficient use of land," and the fact that the land price is still at the bottom has
changed the direction of the debate over land use policy.
Property prices reached the highest in the late 1980s, taking advantage of the
internationalization of the Japanese economy, which led to an extreme concentration of people
in Tokyo. At that time, it was generally believed that land prices were going up because of an
" Yukiko Suzuki, NRI Quarterly, (Tokyo, October 1997), p1 1
inefficient use of land, and this belief gave impetus for to aforementioned revision of the
Productive Green Belt Law and the Land Lease and Building Lease Acts. These policies all
aimed at increasing the overall supply of available land. However, since land prices fell
drastically in 1991, "efficient land use" began to imply increasing the liquidity of real estate
used as collateral against non-performing loans. Current owners, who cannot obtain the
financing source necessary for development of unused plots of urban land that they currently
own, should transfer the land as quickly as possible to people able to develop the property for
more efficient and productive use. However, increasing the liquidity of real estate used as loan
collateral could lead to bankruptcies and requires careful consideration of the circumstances of
each property.
If real estate used as loan collateral is to be more liquid, property prices have to go down even
further and have to reflect the market mechanism. According to the survey held by the Japan
Food Service Association and the Central Bank for Agriculture and Forestry, in 1995, 50% of
respondents said it is easier to open a restaurant than three or four yeas ago. The percentage of
respondents who think it is easy to own a restaurant used to be 3.8% in 1991, and 33.3% in
1993. There is no doubt that it is now easier to own restaurants and retail stores, etc. since land
prices and rents have fallen. Although further depreciation of land prices would cause more
serious problems for people who bought land by borrowing money from banks as well as for
these banks that lent their money to the borrowers, lower land prices would lead to stimulating
business and incorporating liquidity into the system, both of which are vital for normalization of
the real estate market.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES ARE ON THE WAY12
The value of property held as loan collateral has declined greatly. The decline of the value of
real estate held as loan collateral is a healthy consequence when viewed from a long-term
perspective since it reflects a shift to the new appraisal method of property that is based on the
amount of cash flow the property can generate.
A major difficulty in increasing the liquidity of the real estate market is that many properties in
Japan have multiple liens that transcend the property's collateral value and competing claims
greatly complicate the foreclosure process. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in the late 1980's,
Japanese financial institutions in the late 1980s accepted the "land myth" which assumed that
land prices would increase forever, and they kept on lending beyond the capacity of
collateralized real estate value. They even allowed the same piece of property to be used as
collateral for loans from different financial institutions. This practice is one of the reasons the
foreclosure process is very complicated.
It should also be noted that lending practice in Japan is made through corporate financing. In
Japan, project financing which is widely accepted in the U.S. does not exist. Under corporate
financing, the failure of a project in a company affects another project very negatively.<Exhibit
11> On the other hand, under project financing, the failure of a project and foreclosure on its
underlying collateralized real estate would not affect the operation of other properties.
The market of real estate collateral can be more liquid if 1) the lender forgives some of the
debts, ;2) the borrower sells the property voluntarily at a loss if necessary, and 3) the real estate
collateral is auctioned off at a district court after being foreclosed. If the lender and borrower
don't agree on either 1 or 2 above, it is almost impossible to achieve 3 if the borrower is using
the property for business.
2 Yukiko Suzuki, NRI Quarterly, (Tokyo, October 1997), p 12
Exhibit 11: Use of Corporate Financing, Instead of Project Financing, Impedes Real
Estate Liquidity
Project Finance (widely used in U.S)
Borrower (developer)
Lender A
Lender B
Lender C
Lender D
Lender E
" Lending decisions made on basis of one specitic project
* Even if one project fails, other projects can proceed
Corporate Finance (widely used in Japan)
Lender A
Lender B
Lender C
Lender D
Lender E Project E (producing cash flow)
* Foreclosure difficult due to multiple claims on same property
* Liquidity possible if lenders agree to forgive some or all of loan, if the borrower decides to sell, or if
an auction is held; however, it is often difficult to sell the property if it is being used for business or
residences. According to the Japanese real estate customs, an owner or a bank foreclosing the
property is supposed to compensate tenants and residents for moving out of the property. To sell the
property, the seller should have funds for this compensation.
Source: Nomura Financial Research Center
Project A (producing cash flow)
Project B (producing cash flow)
Project C (producing cash flow)
yProject D (producing cash flow)
- Project E (producing cash flow)
FALLING LAND PRICES DO NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY LOW EXPECTATIONS OF
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT13
The most effective way to increase the liquidity of the collateralized real estate market is not
necessarily through the imposition of further laws and regulations. The complicated lending-
borrowing issues of non-performing loans have to be solved first. However, for the time being,
land value held as collateral will continue to fall.
This continued decline in land prices does not imply that the entire real estate market must
suffer from diminishing expectations. Rather, the recent trend of falling land prices reflects the
diminishing expectation of conventional reasons for real estate investment in which the returns
of investment are earned merely by the appreciation of land value. Since the driving force
behind real estate investment is no longer capital gains but income, the value of those properties
that can generate significant cash flows will soon rebound. In fact, rents of new buildings in
convenient locations in central Tokyo have been rising since mid 1996. The majority of
properties in Tokyo continue to fall to the point when most investors start to invest in real estate.
Once many investors start to buy discounted properties, a part of current non-performing loans
may perform better.
DUAL STRUCTURE OF THE REAL ESTATE MARKET' 4
As we have seen, there are reasons for being both optimistic and pessimistic about the Japanese
real estate investment market. This is because the real estate market is still in an adjustment
phase, and market conditions cannot be precisely captured by average values because the
market has a dual structure. That is, some investors think that it is a very good time for real
13 Yukiko Suzuki, NRI Quarterly, (Tokyo, October 1997), p13
'4 NLI Research Institute Homepage, The commercial Investment Real Estate Market in Tokyo, (Tokyo, February
1998), p12
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estate investment while others think that it is one of the worst time for real estate investments.
Therefore, there are factors that drive the real estate market both positively and negatively.
If the demise of the Bubble Economy were seen simply as a cyclical event, I would say that
prices would go up again once the adjustment period ends. However, an increasing population
and a growing economy supported the increase in real estate prices during the Bubble Economy.
In the future, both population and economic growth are expected to decline, giving no support
for a real estate bubble as seen in the past.
Because of structural changes in the real estate market, the basis of price formation in the real
estate investment market is changing from a belief in rising land prices to a rational approach
based on use value. In 1995, the release of official land values finally paid attention to the
discount cash flow method, and in 1997, the new overall land policy promotion outline altered
the objective of land policy from the suppression of land prices to the effective utilization of
land.
Once the real estate investment market in Japan begins to function efficiently, rents for superior
properties should rise because they fell too far in the confusion after the collapse of the Bubble
Economy. In this kind of market, older buildings can also regain high prices once alternations
for earthquake resistance and facilities are enhanced. On the other hand, when the price of a
particular land or building rises, surrounding land prices will no longer rise also.
FACTORS THAT BLOCKED SECURITIZATION'5
In an efficient real estate market, it is totally normal for property prices to be different according
to the cash flow that the property can bring. This is finally occurring in the Japanese real estate
market, although slowly.
However for real estate to be securitized and for securitized products to be circulated at
arbitrated rates with other financial products, the investment environment will need to change
through measures such as constructing an information infrastructure and revising tax laws that
impedes transactions. At this moment, there are many factors that block securitization real
estate and those need to be developed to make securitization successful.
Absence of Proper Infrastructure Necessary for Securitization
> Leasing Code
In the U.S., lease agreements on trade buildings are comparatively long term (around ten years)
and since the lessee must pay any lease fees on the period remaining if it withdraws, long-term
cash flow is secured. In contrast, under the Japanese Leasing Code, lease agreements on office
buildings are in principle renewed every two years and withdrawal is possible without penalty if
a six-month notice is given. This complicates long-term profit predictions and does not
guarantee fee payment, thereby, making an evaluation of capitalized value very difficult. This
clearly blocks the creation of securitized products with a redemption term of more than 5 years.
> Too Many Real Estate Regulations
An inordinately large number of local and prefectural regulations apply to real estate. There are
1 Goldman Sachs (Japan) Ltd., Japan Research, (Tokyo April 1998), p 10-12
strict regulations pertaining to floor area ratios, a strict Building Standards Law, very harsh
environmental assessments, and a counterproductive law that requires the attachment of
residential dwellings to commercial developments. These strict regulations are deterrents to the
smooth cash flow necessary for securitization.
> Tax System
The frequent amendment of real estate tax laws such as acquisition taxes, ownership taxes, or
taxes on transfer profits, is a deterrent to estimating cash flow.
> Separation of Real Estate and Finance
In Japan, a policy that deliberately separates real estate and finance has been in place since the
first oil crisis. Separate government bodies supervise the two sectors: the Ministry of Finance
and the Ministry of Construction. Without changing such an environment, it will be difficult to
enhance liquidity of securitized real estate.
> Servicers ( collection agents)
Especially in the case of real estate collateral, servicers (special agents responsible for collecting
loans) are indispensable. In the United Sates, there are 26 major servicer companies, which
have contributed to the disposal of the bad debts of savings and loan institutions in the early
1990s. Under the Attorneys' Law until now, only lawyers have been permitted to perform
collection work until now. However, Servicers Law, which will allow private institutions to do
collection work as well as lawyers, is going to be enacted in Japan by the end of 1998.
FACTORS THAT ARE CURRENTLY BLOCKING SECURITIZATION
SPC Law' 6
The Special Purpose Company Law was planned and implemented to promote securitization
permitted under the Specified Credit Law, especially to include receivables and other assets.
However, the law seems not to be functioning effectively since it was implemented on
September 1, 1998. Reasons are explained later in this section.
The government intends this law to encourage asset securitization in Japan. The assets targeted
are: 1) non-performing loans of financial institutions; 2) leasing and credit loans; 3) real estate;
and 4) trust beneficiary rights of non-performing loans, leasing and credit loans, and real estate.
These assets are placed with an SPC to protect the management risks of the company, which
created the SPC. Then, these assets are securitized and sold to investors. Through securitizing
its assets through the SPC, the company can get direct financing from investors, which is a new
practice in Japan. Securities include preferred stocks, corporate bonds, and commercial papers
(CP). It is expected that if securitization of real estate is once achieved by SPCs, it will become
possible to sell properties easily and to utilize currently vacant land more efficiently.
However, even after two months have passed since the law was implemented, almost no
companies have registered as SPCs. This is because realtors and other companies are fairly
uncomfortable with the requirement for registering as SPCs. SPC Law requires all the
registering companies disclose the information including the name of the tenants, rents, rent
space, and the expiration date of the lease contracts. The private sector is opposed to the
government in requirements for disclosure, and companies that consider registering as SPCs
6 Nikkei Newspaper, Delayed Securitization, (Tokyo, October 1998)
argue that if they disclosed all rents, it would accelerate the movement of tenants, and thus
confuse the Japanese real estate market. On one hand, what companies think sounds rational.
However, on the other hand, companies may be just showing discomfort with the possible
higher level of disclosure imposed on real estate transaction, if their businesses take advantage
of the low disclosure level.
One of the greatest advantages for the companies that register as SPCs is that the companies can
get direct financing from a wide range of investors in the market by securitizing their assets.
For all the Japanese companies facing the credit crunch, securitizing their assets is a wonderful
alternative to borrowing money from banks. Ministry of Finance argues that it is necessary for
SPCs to disclose their information thoroughly to make the deals transparent in the capital
market. The Ministry is particularly concerned about the much lower level of disclosure of the
real estate market than that of stock and bond markets.
According to the senior management director of the Real Estate Syndication Consortia, the level
of disclosure in the real estate market is not low compared to that in France and Australia, both
of which have a high level of real estate securitization. The United States is the only country
where the real estate market has a higher level of disclosure than that of Japan does.
The private sector's discomfort with the current SPC Law goes beyond the issue of disclosure.
Companies that consider registering an SPC often complain that the income taxes imposed on
SPCs are very high. <Exhibit 12>
SPCs have advantages in acquisition taxes and registration license taxes when a company places
its real estate ownership with its SPC, compared to the case where a company places its real
estate ownership with its joint stock companies. However, there is a growing demand for SPCs
to have full-scale tax exemption. The government imposed acquisition and registration license
taxes on SPCs because if it did not impose taxes on SPCs, the government thought that there
would be many companies that register as SPCs only to obtain full-scale tax exemption without
any plan to securitize their assets. The government has a good point. However, judging from
the fact that almost no companies have registered as SPCs, the government tax imposition on
SPCs may be too rigorous. There is a need to relax the law to promote securitization of real
estate.
Exhibit 12: SPC Taxation
Name of Tax Current System for Real Estate SPC Law
Registration License Tax 5% of tax-appraised value of fixed assets 2.5% of tax-appraised value of fixed
.q.i.n(registration of transfer of assets
Acquisition ownership title)
Taxes Real Estate Acquisition Tax 4% of tax-appraised value of fixed assets 4% of 1/2 tax-appraised value of fixed
assets (special case for two years)
Special Land Ownership Tax 3% of value of land acquired during past Not taxed (special case for two years)
year
Real Estate Tax 1.4% of tax-appraised value of fixed No change
assets
Ownership City Planning Tax 0.3% of tax-appraised value of fixed No change
Taxes assets
Special Land Ownership Tax 1.4% of land value Not taxed (special case for two years)
If specific conditions* are met, the profits
an SPC disburses as dividends are
Corporation Tax 37.5% of taxable income counted as Losses for the purpose of
calculating income.
Registration License Tax (registration of In the case of a Kabushiki kaisha, 7/1000 $214 (Y30,000) per registration
Establishment of company) of capital or $1,071 (Y150,000),
whichever is greater
* The specific conditions are met if any of the following are true:
* The SPC issues $714,000 (Y100 million) or more in special bonds for the public.
* The SPC issues special bonds limited to "eligible institutional investors" (banks and other
financial institutions).
* 50 or more people underwrite the priority investment securities issued by the SPC.
* The SPC issues priority investment securities limited to "eligible institutional investors"
(banks and other financial institutions).
And if both of the following are also true:
* The SPC is conducting business activities in accordance with its asset liquidation plan
and no other than business activities.
* The SPC is disbursing as dividends 90% or more of its income available for dividends to
parties not constituting its family companies under the Corporation Tax Law (excluding
cases in which the SPC issues at least $714,000 (Y100 million) in public special bonds or
special bonds limited to eligible financial institutions).
Source: Goldman Sachs (Japan) Ltd.
CHAPTER 4: HOW TO CARRY OUT TRUE SECURITIZATION
Chapter will discuss: 1) political factors that blocked securitization; 2) desired full- scale
securitization; 3) things needed to carry out true securitization; and 4) merits of securitization.
FACTORS THAT BLOCKED SECURITIZATION POLITICALLY
If the government thinks that securitization is a great idea for disposing non-performing loans,
and for reviving financial market, why wouldn't the government consider securitization earlier?
In the previous chapter, I have described various factors that blocked securitization of real estate
in view of real estate laws, regulations, and infrastructure. Here, I would like to talk about the
factors hampering securitization politically There has been a certain resistance to
securitization because of the disadvantages to certain parties such as real estate owners,
investors, and developers.
> Disadvantages for Real Estate Owners
For most of the Japanese owners of real estate, owning a property allows them to hope that
eventual appreciation of land would benefit them if they were to sell the property. They are
particularly attached to the pride of ownership. Therefore, securitizing their ownership was not
appealing to them even if they could have raised much more profit through securitizing their
property.
> Disadvantages for Investors
For many Japanese investors who are currently extremely risk averse, buying securitized
products is not attractive. For the time being, they may stay away from real estate investment
Goldman Sachs (Japan) Ltd., Japan Research, (Tokyo, April 1998), p23
until the real estate market in Japan recovers.
Regarding real estate, as in the U.S., investing in property in Japan is a good way to reduce
taxes. They can borrow money to buy real estate in Japan. However, once REITs are allowed
in Japan, dividends paid out to REIT investors may be considered taxable. Therefore, Japanese
investors who know about REITs in the U.S. may not think that investing their money on REITs
is a good way to reduce tax.
> Disadvantages for Developers2
Once securitization is accelerated in Japan, the need for large sums of real estate equity and
mortgage funds would be demanded in the form of REITs. However, since REITs have the
same effect as public stock offerings, developers have to disclose a lot of information regarding
their management when establishing REITs. If a developer's business is not going well,
investors won't buy shares in the developer's REITs. Therefore, establishing REITs requires
investors' constant supervision on the developer's business.
The political factors that blocked securitization seem reasonable. However, the government's
efforts over the past year to develop a securizaton scheme are noteworthy and many investors
are now aware of the benefits for new investment products. Therefore, the future of
securitization is still full of hope. As was noted in the Japan Research, 'The situation is like a
fabulous new sports car that has been built when almost the entire road remains to be paved.
But that is the situation we must begin from, and, after all, even an unpaved road gets smoother
with each passing car.3,
2 Goldman Sachs (Japan) Ltd., Japan Research, (Tokyo, April 1998), p2 3
3 Goldman Sachs (Japan) Ltd., Japan Research, (Tokyo, April 1998), p2 3
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DESIRED FULL-SCALE SECURITIZED PRODUCTS 4
The three conditions that make full-scale property security products attractive to regular
investors are as given below.
> The advantages of property investment that can be obtained at a relatively low investment
price.
> Liquidity is maintained
> The investment climate assures reasonable methods for risk evaluation.
The advantages of investing in real estate are conventionally listed as the capital gains to be
earned through tax advantages thanks to its rising land prices. However, ever since the Bubble
Economy burst, investment in anticipation of rising land prices has become less likely.
Traditionally, capital gain does not refer to unearned revenue gained from land resale or holding
on to buildings that are not profitable, but to earnings derived from the value of managing and
using the land appropriately (rent, leases). This type of property income and the actual value of
the asset itself which creates this income (property value) are expected to rise with projected
long-term economic growth and are seen as a hedge to inflation where fixed income bonds and
savings deposits cannot be. It is for these reasons that good quality real estate still offers
attractive investment opportunities.
The property investment market is in disarray due to falling land prices for the first time since
World War II. Moreover, it appears that any investments that rely on land price rises for returns
are being absolutely ignored. However, while investments that do not consider earnings gained
from holding empty land and expecting land prices to rise are being refused, preservation of the
4 Masanori Oka, NLI Research Reports, (Tokyo, November 1997),p5
value of the asset through effective usage or investment that accrues capital gains should not be
ignored.
Until recently, compared to other financial commodities, real estate was not an object for
regular investors due to the high investment prices (or large investment denominations
required), uniqueness of each property, and low liquidity. The purpose of true securitization of
real estate is thus to offer investment opportunities in real estate that ordinary investors can
access in relatively small denominations in a mixed portfolio of properties that can hedge risks.
While the goal of true securitization of real estate is to offer more investment opportunities to
small investors, its greatest advantage is to provide an opportunity to obtain all the benefits of
property investment. It makes sense to preserve secondary liquidity, as it is essential that
financial commodities can be easily sold when required. The establishment of an investment
climate that allows rational assessment of investment risks clarifies the relationship between
risks and returns, provides information that allows comparison with other financial assets, and
provides for financial bodies and investment consultants who can rate and evaluate
circumstances for investors. In this respect, the U.S. already has REITs (Real Estate Investment
Trusts) and MBS (Mortgage Backed Securities) as securitized real estate. REITs are real estate
investment trusts that collect small-lot capital funds from multiple investors, and with the recent
establishment of minimum investment amounts of $830 approximately, these have also become
popular with individual investors. An MBS is a bond backed by residential mortgages or
properties.
The securitization market in the U.S. was not always large. While REITs have been threatened
twice in the past in connection to market crises, the market has currently grown to a healthy
trading size with individual investors, in particular baby boomers who are managing their assets
in preparation for retirement.
The process of developing securitized products in the U.S. was the refinement of different
experiences that eventually showed these products to be attractive to investors. In addition,
these securitized products are monitored by the Securities and Exchange Commission which is
strict in instructing corporate bodies to provide investors with information regarding the tenant
agreement conditions for real estate and predicted returns and this system means that investors
are well informed.
THINGS NEEDED TO CARRY OUT TRUE SECURITIZATION'
Many things need to be done to carry out true securitization of real estate.
*. Revising Real Estate Appraisal Method
The Real Estate appraisal method should take into greater account a discount cash flow model
to make land value reflect income it can generate. To securitize real estate, what matters most is
the possible income gain of the property. Therefore, property appraisal should be based mainly
on the cash flow it can produce. This will encourage investors to figure out the risks and returns
associated with the securitized products that they buy.
- Revising the Leasing Code
It is important to make lease agreements long-term (about 10 years) to secure long-term profit,
which makes it possible to estimate risks and returns on the property. Without long term
income gain, it is impossible to securitize properties.
5 Goldman Sachs (Japan) Ltd., Japan Research, (Tokyo, April 1998), p10-12
+: Relaxing Real Estate Regulations
It is necessary to abolish or relax some of the complicated real estate regulations to achieve
smooth securitization.
*. Revising Real Estate Taxation System
Whereas in the U.S. and Europe, real estate sales profits (transfer profits) are normally included
in corporate income, and are taxed at operating corporate tax rates, in Japan these profits are
calculated at long-term corporate tax rates of 5% (5 years or more), short-term rates at 10%
(over 2 years and under 5), or ultra-short-term rates at 15% (under 2 years), lowering the rate of
return after tax. Therefore, taxation on real estate sales profits should be revised to be fairer.
Also, the Real Estate Acquisition Tax and the Registration and License Tax, which impose
higher transaction taxes than in the U.S. and Europe, should be revised so as to reduce real
estate taxation costs related to property transactions in Japan.
* Developing a Secondary Market
Without a secondary market, the liquidity of securitized products is extremely limited.
Therefore, developing a secondary market is indispensable to allow investors to buy and sell
securitized products freely. The Government should set proper laws and regulations to allow
companies to list real estate securities in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Once infrastructure for the
secondary market is well prepared, it is the job of investment banks and real estate related
companies to create attractive securitized products for investors.
Considering the Real Estate Market as a Part of the Capital Market
Currently the real estate market and the capital market in Japan are supervised under different
government bodies since the two markets are considered to be separate. However,
securitization of real estate is involved in the capital market exclusively. Therefore, the
government should consider the strong link between the two markets.
* Adopting Non-Recourse Financing
As mentioned in the previous chapter, with-recourse financing is the form typically used in
Japan. However, in the U.S., the majority of mortgage properties are financed by non-recourse
finance. Under non-recourse financing, a failure of a project and foreclosure on its underlying
collateralized real estate do not affect the operation of other property, which ensures liquidity of
collateralized real estate.
* Revising the SPC Law
The SPC Law's strict requirement that all the registering companies disclose detailed
information regarding the property they are to securitize should be relaxed. Acquisition and
registration license taxes on SPCs should also be relaxed to encourage companies to register as
SPCs, thus promoting securitization of real estate.
As long as there is no revision in the aforementioned areas, even if the ban on property
investment trusts such as REITs were lifted, the real estate securities market would not expand.
If we are to undertake true securitization of real estate, we must carry out reforms so that the
basic conditions of the capital market are incorporated in the normal real estate investment
market6 .
* The Use of Public Funds to Augment the Financial System
Without stability, the financial market would remain inactive, regardless of reforms mentioned
earlier. In such a market, it is impossible to carry out successful securitization. Therefore, it is
important for the Japanese Government to augment the capital market. The government should
use public funds to restructure financial institutions, which is currently hampering the capital
market to work efficiently. One of the most recent government plans to use public funds is the
Financial Revitalization Plan, announced in July 1998. One of the main objectives of this plan
includes stabilizing the financial system and augmenting the function of the system. One
hundred and one billion dollars (13 trillion yen) are to be allocated to private financial
institutions to tackle the current credit crunch and 250 billion dollars (30 trillion yen) are to be
used to restructure financial institutions: this means covering the loss from disposing non-
performing loans, taking care of the assets of failed financial institutions, and compensating for
the loss arising from the failed financial institutions.
I mentioned earlier in this thesis that many financial institutions could not easily sell the loan
collateral because of the possible large loss from the sale. Because of this, the government's
decision to use public funds in this way is a right move. However, it remains to be seen if
public money allocated to these financial institutions are managed efficiently to promote
liquidation of loan collateral.
6 Masanori Oka, NLI Research Reports, (Tokyo, April 1998) p I-10.
MERITS OF SECURITIZATION
As I mentioned earlier, true securitization cannot be achieved without reform of the real estate
investment market's practices and systems. The Japanese government is already aware of the
securitization of real estate as a way to dispose of non-performing loans, and as a measure of
financial market stimuli. As I have seen, many financial institutions have started to liquidate
their assets, mainly non-performing loans with major foreign investment banks, although most
of the deals are not profitable to the Japanese banks. Even though there are still many
difficulties such as long-established Japanese real estate customs, low infrastructure for MBS,
and a quite high tax rate, Japanese real estate securitization has a large potential to be further
developed. Here is a list of benefits of securitization of real estate in Japan7 .
Merits for Fundraiser (Business)
> Diversifying financing methods
> Enabling diverse development projects and arrangements
Merits for Investors
> Expansion of investment opportunities
> Diversification of investment instruments
> Reduction of liquidity risk of real estate
> More information obtainable in the real estate market
7 Masanori Oka, NLI Research Reports, (Tokyo, April 1998), p9
Merits for Real Estate Markets
> Encouragement of a sound and active market
> Wide product variety that allows arbitration with other financial products
> Encouragement of entry by domestic and foreign investors
> Market expansion through formation of securitization market
> Emphasis on returns and use value of real estate
> Progress in disposal of non-performing loans and collateral real estate
Changes in the real estate market can be accelerated by the emergence of attractive real estate
securitized products, such as securitization of a famous high- rise building or a large-scale
development project located in the center of a city. Considering the possibility that the revised
foreign exchange law could cause funds to shift to REITs in the U.S., work needs to be started
immediately on securitization by fundraisers, investors, government agencies, and other market
participants.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION: REALISTIC EXPECTATION OF WHAT
SECURITIZATION CAN DO FOR THE JAPANESE REAL ESTATE MARKET AND THE
ECONOMY
This chapter will conclude with realistic goals of securitization for the Japanese economy and
the real estate market. It will also analyze the impact of securitization to the Japanese market.
THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S EXPECTATION OF SECURITIZATION
Securitization is often mistakenly considered to be a panacea for non-performing loans.
However, it will not erase the damage caused by the real estate bubble, nor will it suddenly
improve the performance of assets. It is risky to expect too much of securitization as a solution
to non-performing loans. Right now in Japan, the government puts a high expectation on what
securitization can do for non-performing loans, as can be seen from the ruling party's interim
report on their Financial Revitalization Total Plan. In this plan, the ruling party, the Liberal
Democratic Party, expresses its firm intention to set up an environment that facilitates
securitization of assets, especially, non-performing assets.
SECURITIZING NON-PERFORMING LOANS IS NOT UNREALISTIC, BUT IT IS
VERY DIFFICULT FOR JAPAN
It is true that it is possible to securitize any assets that generate cash flows. These assets include
auto loans, leasing loans, credit loans, and credit receivables. However, the most non-
performing loan collateral includes properties that currently do not generate enough cash flow
or have great difficulties to securitize. These collateral include: 1) vacant lands; 2) designated
farmlands which do not have permission to develop; 3) urbanization controlled areas and
irregularly shaped lands which do not have construction permission; and 4) leased lands.
Securitized products that are backed by such real estate are not attractive to investors since they
cannot provide much dividends or interests to investors. Therefore, buyers won't easily buy
such asset backed securities. Furthermore, as often with the case of non-performing loans, there
are many collateral lenders associated with the same property. In many cases, during the
Bubble Economy, there were more than 6 financial institutions that lent money, collateralizing
the same property. This fact greatly complicates the process securitization, let alone foreclosing
the property.
Securitizing non-performing loans successfully requires super expertise in real estate
management and finance, combined with knowledge of Japan's peculiar real estate regulations.
As the vice president of a major leasing company, ORIX, Mr.Katsuaki Ishida, mentioned, "even
in the U.S. where securitization is practiced generally, securitizing non-performing loans is not
carried out in many cases now." Even though, in the past, the RTC successfully securitized
non-performing loans, the agency was fortunate in that the U.S. had better infrastructure for
secondary market and much less complexities in loan collateral, which helped to develop
securitization.
The question remains whether securitization of non-performing loans can be successful in
Japan, where the securitization business is in its infancy as compared to that of the U.S.
An investment banker working in Tokyo commented "once derivatives were treated as magical
wands in the Japanese financial market. Now, it seems that the derivatives are replaced with
securitization." Will securitization bring no significant benefits in the end or will it have a
meaningful impact on the Japanese economy and financial market? The next section will
address the real implications of securitization, realistic expectations for securitization and its
effect on the Japanese economy.
REALISTIC EXPECTATION OF WHAT SECURITIZATION OF REAL ESTATE CAN
DO FOR THE JAPANESE ECONOMY
1. A Shift From Indirect Financing to Direct Financing'
Financial institutions are urged to reduce their assets such as loan credits to meet the required
return over asset ratio known as ROA 2 which is determined by Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) and to overcome increased competitions among financial institutions because
of the Japanese financial deregulation, Big Bang. To reduce assets, what banks do is: 1) sell off
their assets if they are of good quality; 2) sell or replace the assets to the Credit Cooperation
Purchasing Corporation (CCPC) if the assets include non-performing loans, or; 3) securitize
their assets such as properties with a strong income stream. By reducing their assets, banks can
recover a "healthy looking balance sheet" that is necessary to receive a high grade by rating
agencies. By the end of 1997, major Japanese banks reduced their risk assets including credit
loans by $ 283.3 billion (34 trillion yen), or a decrease of 7.7% comparing to 1996. Because of
this, banks are very reluctant to lend money. As a result, many companies and individuals find
it very hard to borrow money from banks currently. Even companies with good performance
and sound credit history often can not rely on bank loans. It is the problem of financial
institutions that make companies unable to obtain money from indirect financing.
Consequently, it is inevitable for companies to get financing other than bank loans. Therefore,
there will be a growing demand for direct financing: issuing bonds, stocks, and securities
backed by their assets and getting funding from a wide range of investors in the market directly.
The distinction between direct financing, namely, stocks, bonds, commercial papers, and
East Asian Economic Weekly, (Tokyo June 13, 1998), p1 1-13
2 Return over total asset = (net income + net tax or interest expense) / average total assets. A higher ROA indicates a
better performance on the company's management and leads to higher stock price and higher bond rating of the
company
securities backed by assets is that the first three ways of direct financing are based particularly
on the company's creditworthiness. However, securities backed by assets such as real estate
are different. One of the key merits of securitization is that companies can get direct financing
using the creditworthiness of their assets such as income generating real estate<Exhibit 13>.
This gives a great opportunity to obtain financing for not only large companies, but also middle-
and small sized-companies, which face great difficulties in borrowing money from banks
currently.
Exhibit 13: Corporate Financing and Asset Financing
Indirect Financing Direct Financing
Corporate Financing Bank loan Bonds, stocks, commercial papers
Asset Financing Factoring, Securitized products (trust beneficiary rights, asset
Project financing backed securities, asset backed commercial paper)
* factoring: selling a company's accounts receivable (not securitizing them)
Source: East Asian Economic Weekly, June 13, 1998, P12
Direct financing, especially securitization will contribute to many companies that suffer from
the current credit crunch. By securitizing their assets such as real estate, these companies can
get necessary funding to inject more capital in their businesses. Indeed, securitization has a key
to stimulate the entire business sector.
2. Widened Techniques to Manage Japanese Individual Assets Equivalent to $10 Trillion
Japanese individual assets amount to $10 trillion approximately<Exhibit 14>.
Exhibit 14: The Detail of Total Individual Assets in Japan and the U.S.
The Detailof the TotalU B. bdiiflualAssets
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V life insurance213.1%
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Source: The Diamond Weekly, June 6, 1998
As the figure shows, low interest bank deposits account for 56% of all the individual assets
approximately. This ratio of bank deposits is significantly higher than that of U.S., which is
16%. Therefore, by securitizing real estate, especially those that generate significant income,
The Detailof the TotalJapanese 3hdtrlualAssets
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and denominating the securities to make them available to individual investors, a higher portion
of the entire individual assets will be managed more efficiently. At the same time, the
techniques for managing the Japanese individual assets will be more diversified. Managing
individual assets more efficiently and diversifying the techniques to manage them are very
important to restructuring the Japanese capital market because the capital market needs more
funds to be revitalized.
3. Increasing Real Estate Transaction
Since securitization allows a wide range of corporate and individual investors, securitization
will dramatically increase real estate related transactions and promote more efficient use of land
because many property owners will try to make their property to generate cash if they want to
securitize their property. Also, there are many property owners, especially corporate property
owners, interested in securitizing their property to obtain necessary funds for their businesses.
If the properties are used properly so as to generate enough cash flow, the property price will no
longer fall. However, except for some properties in central Tokyo, this is not the case for most
properties. Securitization is expected to spur property owners' attention to manage their
property more efficiently, such as constructing a commercial, residential, or office building.
This will have a positive effect on revitalizing real estate market and the Japanese economy.
4. New Business Opportunities3
Securitization of real estate brings great opportunities to "fee businesses" such as a real estate
investment advisory business, and an asset management business. The real estate industry gives
3 The Diamond Weekly, (Tokyo, June 6, 1998), p41
the impression of being a "hard industry" which provides properties and buildings to users.
However, the future real estate industry will become more of a "soft industry" which provides
various know-how regarding real estate investment. There is especially great potential in the
following new businesses:
" Planning and Development of Real Estate Investment Products
* Real Estate Investment Advisory and an Asset Management business
In 1997, Mitsui Real Estate, one of the largest real estate companies in Japan, established a real
estate investment advisory company and other large-scale developers have established the same
kind of advisory business. Since many banks are also trying to enter this business, there will be
a high competition among them.
* Business That Manages Buildings and Tenants
Real estate companies that manage properties will need to enhance their know-how in
generating more cash flow in order to enhance the value of their securitized products.
These new businesses will spur the demand of both corporate and individual investors interested
in real estate investment. The new businesses will actively make these investors involved in the
real estate market, which will contribute to revitalizing the market and, further, the Japanese
economy.
5. Impact on the Real Estate Market
Securitization of real estate promotes the adoption of discount cash flow method for land
evaluation and disclosure of information regarding securitized real estate. In the actual real
estate market, transactions will be more open, fair in terms of pricing, and the market's order
will be enhanced. The Japanese real estate bubble comes partly from the Japanese conventional
method of "sales comparison", which determined land prices based on the surrounding land
property value. Therefore, with a real estate market in which property pricing is based on the
income gain of the property, it becomes possible to prevent dramatic increases or decreases in
real estate prices, which were seen during the bubble economy.
The second major impact of securitization on the real estate market is that the level of disclosure
of real estate transactions will be enhanced. For example, when investors buy commercial
mortgage backed securities, they need to know the vacancy rate of the building, the tenants'
trend of moving in and out of the building, their type and term of leasing, and their trend of
paying full rent without fail. At this moment, this information regarding properties is not
disclosed in Japan. The third major impact of securitization is that the liquidity of real estate
will be more enhanced. Securitization of real estate will lead to property owners' paying more
attention to the cash flows that their property can generate. This is because investors, of course,
want to buy securities backed by such income generating properties. Therefore, once various
securized products become available to a wide range of investors, the liquidity of real estate will
improve.
The adoption of the discount cash flow method, enhanced level of disclosure, and improved
liquidity level will certainly contribute to control of the Japanese real estate market of current
stagnancy. Once the real estate market starts to be active again, the whole capital market will
be revitalized, leading the entire Japanese economy to recover from the long lasting recession.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have discussed various implications of what securitization can do for the
Japanese real estate market and the Japanese economy. First, securitization will enable a shift
from indirect financing to direct financing, which is particularly beneficial for many companies
with difficulty in borrowing money from banks. Second, it will lead to managing the huge
Japanese individual assets more effectively. Third, it will increase real estate transactions.
Fourth, it will bring new businesses to the real estate industry. And finally, it will help get out of
the current real estate stagnancy.
It is expected that the creation of a healthy securitization market in Japan would facilitate
necessary structural adjustments in Japan's financial economy and dramatically increase the
liquidity available to Japanese companies including financial institutions. Financial institutions,
especially, would in turn be able to raise their capital adequacy to international standards and
spread the risks inherent in asset portfolios. This may work positively to solve the current credit
crunch.
Whether real estate securitization can be successfully carried out relies on the motivation of the
Japanese government and market participants. It is important for the Japanese government to
look at securitization as more than merely a means to solve the bad debt problem.
Securitization in Japan, which is in its infancy, can not offer much to solve this problem in a
short run. However, it has a large potential to be a market stimulus to the currently ailing
capital market and real estate market in a long run. Indeed, securitization of real estate would
contribute significantly to the revival of these markets in Japan.
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